Introduction
The world-wide competition situation has changed dramatically over the last 20 years. The longestablished division of the world economy into, on the one hand, Europe and the United States (US) as centres of economic prosperity and technical advance, and on the other, the rest of the world which is far from being able to attain high per-capita incomes, is no longer valid. The successful industrialisation process in the Japanese national economy and the success of the small tiger states have led to fiercer international competition in world markets. The US and the European Union (EU) states can no longer afford to be complacent about the positions they have achieved thus far. The increasing globalisation of the markets and enhanced mobility of capital, as well as the everincreasing relevance of so-called intangible investments, call for new strategies both from enterprises and State economic policy representatives.
The above-mentioned industrialisation processes in national economies in eastern Asia have given rise to very extensive discussion on possible recipes for success in industrial policy. Discussion centres in particular on the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) whose role in Japan's industrial policy structure have become legendary. A central theme of these debates is the international competitiveness of enterprises.
1 What, for example, are the factors that determine a successful existence of enterprises in world markets? What enables enterprises of certain national economies to outstrip competitors from other countries in the areas of research and development? Besides some other factors, the government is allowed a certain degree of scope in shaping matters.
It is in this context that the question is often raised as to what an adequate industrial policy is.
This paper is intended to give a short insight into the industrial policy concepts of the EU, Japan and the US, which will be expanded in the third section with the inclusion of newer developments in economic theory. The final section will comprise a short summary as well as possible conclusions that can be drawn from the perceptions presented.
industry, the nuclear industry, micro-electronics, and in the production of electronic data processors, as well as the related information and telecommunications industry. Preservation and structural adjustment subsidies were applied particularly in economic fields such as coal, steel, ship-building. In addition to a support policy directed towards single sectors, all other measures to protect the economy have, however, implications for industrial politicy, especially when these contribute to an improvement in the location quality of the respective country or region in relation to foreign locations. Industrial policy is therefore pursued also as structural policy, support for regional economies, and research and development, or technological policy, as well as support for the smaller and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs). In Eastern Germany too, the State has adopted a structure-shaping rôle as clearly demonstrated by the Treuhandanstalt and the extensive catalogue of measures to support the economy.
A significant problem in this debate is that no synopsis exists of all measures relevant to industrial policy and their effects which are perceived at national and local government level and increasingly at EU level. This is partly a consequence of Germany's federal structure. In addition to this, industrial policy competencies at the two government levels are handled by different specialist ministers. This pluralistic support system leads therefore to competition, but also to an uncoordinated juxtaposition of the different participants. This makes it difficult to determine the extent of state involvement in industrial policy and often results in inefficient use of resources (see f.e. Buigues/Jaquemin/Sapir 1995). One indication of this fact is the presence of multiple support forms. Because economic policy measures fall to a number of different representatives, these often lack the readiness to weigh up the use of an industrial policy operation for a national economy against its overall economic costs and to adopt the optimum economic criteria. Often a sufficient measure of success is not achieved because of unclear aims being set, or it comes only to marginal corrections to industrial policy practice. Over and above this, the lack of transparency favours rent-seeking behaviour by the supported enterprises, regions and institutions. Further, the intransparent support system creates favourable conditions for covering up the extent of government involvement, although, on the other hand, competition offers the participants the opportunity to try out alternative support systems.
At the European level, in view of the above-mentioned developments in the world markets, the concept of a Community industrial policy has increasingly emerged in recent years through the initiative of the European Commission. In its November 1990 report to the Council and the European Parliament on Industrial Policy in an Open and Competitive Environment the Commission presented the basis for an EU industrial policy concept (EC 1990) . The achievement and preservation of favourable outline conditions for enterprises, a positive concept of industrial conformity, the retention of open markets, and the acceleration of the process of industrial conformity were seen as the key elements of this economic policy. Consequently, preserving the competitiveness of European industry is only possible through a willingness to accept steady change, and adapting to new terms of competition. Enterprises have to adapt themselves to the world market and should not be protected by measures that hinder competition. Several responsibilities must be fulfilled by EU bodies as necessary prerequisites for realising the conformity process seen as necessary. First, it must be guaranteed that a competition-orientated environment will be preserved, in order that only enterprises sufficiently capable of competing in world markets can emerge. Above all, the creation of the Single Market will be seen as a sort of "training" for enterprises. In addition, in the Commission's view, stable outline conditions have to be met, particularly as regards taxation and financial policy, to guarantee high levels of education, as well as support for economic and social cohesion, whilst simultaneously achieving a high level of environmental protection.
An industrial policy intended to meet this aim cannot amount to a laissez-faire policy. It must, rather, be based on a common, social consensus, containing an adequate blend of European, national and local economic policy, in which particularly the principle of subsidiarity should be applied. In this context mechanisms producing a catalytic effect are envisaged. The Commission is counting on the realisation of the Single Market and maintaining free external trade. Only when enterprises are faced with sufficient competition, will they be able to prove their worth in the world market. In this context, as a result of the experiences of the 1970s and 1980s, the Commission is turning away from a sectoral economic policy. A horizontally-aligned strategy is instead the preferred option.
The EU Commission's proposals were put into more concrete terms in the White Paper Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. An aim closely associated with this future European industrial policy is to secure and increase employment in the Union by creating, or preserving, the competitiveness of European enterprises. By the end of the millennium 15 million new jobs should be created, and much of the emphasis will be on investment. Any further decline in investment rates should be avoided by the formation of improved outline conditions. With this in mind, the EU Commission is endeavouring to broaden the advantages of European national economies in terms of labour potential and infrastructure.
One of the main problems facing European enterprises is seen to be that they sometimes hold a poor position in important markets with big returns and growth potential, particularly in the areas of electronics, data processing and medical equipment. The result in these sectors is lower labour productivity compared with Japan and the US. This dilemma is added to by relatively low research and development rates, which even show signs of declining growth trends. Because of the increasing dematerialisation of national economic production, in other words, the ever-greater significance of intangible production factors, the Commission is setting great store by the development and exploitation of general and specific (specialised) knowledge. At the same time, the cost structure of enterprises is being influenced less and less by direct costs relating to production factors. Consequently, in the long run falling labour costs will not make a sufficient contribution to preserving competitiveness (EC 1993:81) . Research and development, training and retraining, investments in infrastructure, as well as industrial organisation are the foundations for future success in the world market.
3
Among the most important areas of action for a common European Industrial policy are the socalled trans-European networks, i.e. transport, energy transport and telecommunications networks. These infrastructure facilities should, on the one hand, have productivity-boosting effects and, on the other, create jobs by their construction and later use. The Commission also sees problems which have to be solved in the Union as regards promotion and coordination of research. One that particularly needs to be addressed is the lack of commercial exploitation of research results for spreading new technologies. Research and development have to be more tailored to the demands of the market. Despite the above-mentioned reservations as regards sector-specific industrial policy measures, the Commission intends to promote so called industries of the future, concentrating on such areas as information technology, bio-technology and the audio-visual sector. There are high 3 Table 1 contains an overview of the proposals contained in the White Paper.
by Georg Erber, Harald Hagemann and Stephan Seiter hopes that supporting these industries will have positive external effects first for other sectors and secondly for the creation of new markets. Successes in the field of information technology might, for example, serve to boost productivity in many other branches. The establishment of a trans-European information system offers the possibility of new service industries and the jobs they bring with them.
In recent years the first steps have been taken towards achieving this aim: the Single Market was introduced in 1993, the GATT negotiations were brought to a close, and in the area of research policy a stronger orientation towards the markets was established as a basis in the Community's fourth outline programme for research and technological development (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) . With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and article 130 by the Commission, the contractual foundations for a common industrial policy were set. Despite this (partial) success, against the backdrop of rising unemployment in the early 1990s, the Commission sees the need for further action. In autumn 1994 additional areas of industrial policy action were set out in a comprehensive report An industrial competitiveness policy for the European Union (EC 1994) . Four aspects merit special attention: promotion of immaterial investments, development of industrial cooperation, ensuring fair competition, and modernisation of the public sector.
The suggested catalogue of measures is very extensive. In the area of intangible investment particularly training and the improvement of qualifications in new technologies are seen as worth promoting. The Commission is proposing, for example, tax relief on intangible assets and measures for further training. Significant emphasis is also being placed on guaranteeing equal competition rights. Since in many extra-Union countries there are different environmental specifications and social systems, European enterprises often have to reckon with higher costs than their international competitors. The EU therefore has to push internationally for prevention of social and environmental dumping. The public sector too should make a contribution towards increasing competition. In this respect removing red tape and increasing flexibility of administrative structures is being considered and there is a push for more extensive deregulation.
Whilst achievement of these aims might meet with approval, the issue of promotion of industrial cooperation should be looked upon with scepticism. Clearly, a more comprehensive exchange of information between companies has to be supported at the national, European and international level. Know-how from other economic regions might, for example, be put to better use by European companies and access to new markets might be facilitated. There must, however, be a guarantee that adequate competition will continue to exist and that competition will not lead to enterprise conspiracies and domination of the market. -Pursuing initiatives aimed at facilitating a concerted revival in consumption at world level -Promoting the emergence of new markets
Supply side measures:
-Encouraging continuing structural adjustment by supporting privatizations -Underpinning the dynamism of small and medium-sized enterprises
Measures to improve the relationship between supply and demand:
-Facilitating pertnerships between large firms and their subcontractors -Improving the interfaces between producers and users -Establishing colloboration networks so as to develop clusters of competitive activities Indeed, in recent years, a series of strategic alliances have grown up involving airline companies (for example Lufthansa -United Airlines, Thai Airways, SAS) and micro-electronics (Siemens, IBM, Toshiba), and mostly across country boundaries. There are good economic reasons for this, namely that through transnational company mergers or through acquisition of foreign enterprises because of complimentarity, comparative advantages in global competition can be achieved more easily than at the national level. Empirical case studies on the consequences of such amalgamations show, however, that they more often than not lead to failure. This begs the as yet inconclusivelyanswered question, as to why enterprises enter into these deals so often. At least, German experiences with the mega-fusion of Daimler-Benz with AEG or DASA, including its temporary temporary share-holding in Fokker, and the amalgamation of Siemens with Nixdorf cannot be seen as particularly successful examples.
The EU Commission's publications, briefly introduced above, and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty with its Article 130 which is so important for European Industrial policy, did not only meet with approval. Frequently the regulations in article 130 in particular were seen as too general and might make for the possibility of an interventionist industrial policy which directly encroaches on the market. A particular problem is therefore that of merger controls that are not suited to competitiveness, because industrial policy aims can take precedence over competition criteria. 4 The dangers of abandoning principles of industrial policy are visible especially from the German viewpoint, as demonstrated by the ordoliberal school. One of the main arguments against a greater involvement of EU bodies in the area of industrial policy is a lack of adequate systems of incentive for the officials responsible and a lack of necessary information for a successful industrial policy. What is also interesting is how economists (such as Otto Schlecht) who are not suspected of interventionist convictions can still interpret the rulings in the Maastricht Treaty as positive even as regards competition policy. The declaration of open competition is firmly anchored in Article 130.
The sought-after and partly-implemented EU industrial policy can be demonstrated by the following points:
• The main priority is strengthening the competitiveness of European enterprises.
• Industrial policy measures should not in the long run distort competition.
• Structural conservation and protection instruments should be restrained.
• Research and development and intangible investments are to be considered a priority.
• A switch to more market-orientated research should take place.
• There should be more widespread promotion of research and development results.
• Support for small and medium-sized enterprises is to be extended further.
• State-Science-Economy dialogue is to be intensified.
• Trans-European networks are being extended.
• EU burocracy should work as a coordinator and catalyst. 4 See for example the report of the Monopolkommission (1992) and Schmidt (1992) .
EU industrial policy action cannot be as separate from the developments among its important trading partners. Japan and the US in particular are potential competitors, when it comes to international competitiveness. Since the collapse of her bubble economy at the end of the 1980s, Japan has been experiencing a difficult domestic political crisis and finds herself in a fundamental debate concerning necessary changes to her economic policy. The old style of industrial policy was increasingly playing a secondary rôle. As a result of Japan's hasty process to have her national economy catch up with the Western industrialised nations, the Japanese government now faces quite new industrial policy challenges. Japan too has to discover new markets and to identify new growthintensive industries, which increases the danger of failures through increasing insecurity. Japanese industrial policy is concentrated more than ever on promoting science, research and innovation. Attention centres particularly on the key sectors, i.e. the sectors seen as basic technology, such as for example superconductors, new materials, biotechnology, software, and environmental and medical technology. It is expected that these industries will first supplement the existing branch structures and, secondly, be a core for crystallising new economic branches. In addition, a higher value is being placed on training/further training and investments in infrastructure.
A further indication of Japan's current development trends is the changed position of Japan's Ministry of Industrial Trade and Development (MITI). It has transformed itself from what was apparently an all-powerful planning and steering ministry to a centre of information and coordination, which in the framework of so-called visions, expounds far-reaching objectives as well as possible development opportunities and potential markets for Japanese enterprises. This is a further indication that the process of erosion of State influence over Japanese enterprises seems irreversible as a result of the increasing globalisation and the accompanying inconsistency between business and national interests. In light of the conflicts in trade policy with the US and the EU, the room for manoeuvre as regards Japan's industrial policy activities is being further squeezed, in that the pressure of compensatory measures in the US and EU no longer guarantees economic success in trade with these countries. To name but one example, there was the failure of the MUSE HDTV technology. The dependence of important branches of Japanese industry (for example, vehicle production, consumer electronics) on the US and Western European markets owing to the lack of viable alternatives forces the utmost restraint from the Japanese administration when it comes to a massive industrial-political encroachment in these areas. Otherwise, the pressure from US and EU trade policy would become stronger. Through a gradual opening of the Japanese market by dismantling non-tariff trade barriers, Japan's economic interest is therefore increasingly moving towards obtaining the compliance of the US and EU, to achieve a slow dismantling of the high external trade surplus with these countries. In the framework of this development it is planned for example that the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) should make necessary information about the Japanese market available to foreign enterprises. In addition, partnerships between domestic and foreign enterprises will be promoted via a Business Support Centre. Like the EU Commission, the Japanese government is hoping to achieve an international transfer of knowledge as a result of this measure.
This development in Japan is accompanied and supported by changing values emerging among the Japanese people. Consumers are no longer ready to accept the high costs of protecting the domestic market against international competition, as these are generally met by the consumer and small and medium-sized enterprises. In this context, the theme of intensifying political controls on competitiveness and deregulation of domestic markets has become more significant. The dual structure of the Japanese national economy, making them world leaders in some technology-intensive economic branches, whilst other important sectors, particularly the service industries (such as the retail trade, insurance and banking), and agriculture, lagged behind the capabilities of other industrial countries, was seen as critical for Japan's future position in international competitiveness. Given that international trade with service industries has long been expanding at a faster rate than trade in goods, in the long term the current dual structure of the Japanese economy is seen as a disadvantage. The consequent restructuring measures will put to the test the social consensus over economic policy measures which have long been a central element in Japanese policy. It is no longer the case that what is good for Japanese big business is also good for Japan.
With the EU's second large trading partner, the US, industrial policy has been and still is looked upon with scepticism. Despite claims of free markets, massive sectoral industrial policy has nonetheless been carried out in the US in the area of arms policy (Graham 1995) . With the replacement of President Bush by Clinton, a changed concept of industrial policy seemed to be looming. In particular, Clinton's Employment Minister and close adviser, Robert Reich, is demanding a more dynamic rôle for the State in economic activity. By taking social consensus as a basis, an economic policy should be followed through to overcome the weaknesses of the US/American economy. This points particularly to the large deficit in the public education system and management of the conversion process in the arms sector. With the help of considerable investment in education, the Federal Government hopes to guarantee the conditions for providing the human capital production factor, seen as important in new technology. In addition to these measures, support for key technologies is intended. The US too is assuming that this technology has a multipleuse character, in other words it could be used in many sectors, decisively enhancing the productivity of other production factors. Central to this is the creation of competitive computer and communications structures, governed by the key words information superhighways. For this reason a programme for progressive technology was activated and a Task Force on Information Infrastructure brought into being. The Clinton administration intends to promote the dialogue between industry and the State and to intensify the exchange of knowledge via joint research programmes. All support for research should therefore be directed more towards commercial requirements.
US industrial policy, dominated by the tensions of deficits both in the national budget and foreign trade, is characterised by support for specific sectors, as well as horizontal promotion of research and reform of the education system. These measures go hand in hand with a planned improvement of cooperation between enterprises and state offices as well as an improvement in how research efforts are directed towards the commercial applications of research and development results. Following the loss of the Clinton government's democratic majority in the last elections for Congress, it too was faced by further restrictions to its room for manoeuvre on industrial policy. It appears from this, that in the mid-1990s, the development of an active US industrial policy, embarked upon at the beginning of the decade, is no longer proceeding at the rate pursued until now. As a result of pressure from the Republican majority, a partial revision of the measures taken so far can be expected in the future. We need look no further back than the debates between the President and the Republicans over passing the household budget at the turn from 1995 to 1996 for evidence of this tendency.
If we look at the overall industrial policy concepts of the EU, Japan and the US, we are struck by the existence of a convergence between objectives and measures. In all three regions governments are placing value on the promotion of human capital, support for so-called key technologies and the benefits of the external effects connected with this, commercial alignment of research and development investments, and better State-science-economy communication. This correspondence results from largely identical assessments of world market tendencies and new technology requirements, which have decidedly altered the national economic production process. Future development will show to what extent this similarity in proceeding will bring success for all involved. One problem is the creation of overcapacities in the area of key technologies. Critics see the same problems arising as for ship-building or coal extraction. The counter-argument is that these sectors are strategically so significant, that leading industrial nations cannot afford not to be represented in them (see f.e. Seitz 1994).
Owing to the world recession and the transformation of East Germany into an internationallycompetitive economic area, in Germany the debate around a new industrial policy has intensified. The general public seems to have recognised the need to create a more sound concept of industrial policy, based on a broad consensus of all groups affected. True as this may be, it remains to be seen whether the search for agreement between the groups will not diminish as a result of a reduced compulsion to act, following a new economic upturn in Germany and in the international markets and overcoming East Germany's most pressing harmonisation difficulties. If this happens, this would be an indication of the unsatisfactory long-term direction of the industrial policy debate, which finds economical and political acceptance in times of recession only to often run out of steam in ad hoc measures, such as the promotion of Transrapid, support for Siemens setting up a semi-conductor plant in Dresden, etc.
If the planned horizontal measures are being implemented in other places, while in Germany the appropriate factors are being neglected, there is the possibility of further losses in competitiveness and consequently of jobs. If the US and Japan, like other countries (e.g. South Korea) divert a greater amount of their investment capacity into research and development, while here in Germany money is used in a more consumptive way, the technological gap between the German national economy and those of the US and Japan might widen. Under these circumstances competitiveness would fall and the important export markets would shrink.
New theoretical structures
The concepts of a common industrial policy established by the EU can, like the objectives of the US/American and Japanese governments be partly supported by newer developments in economic theory. The new growth theory, which since the mid-1980s has received greater attention in the academic world and particularly in the US, delivers a series of new interrelated fields for the recourse to industrial policy instruments. The models discussed here demonstrate what effects State intervention can have on the supply side. The central issues here are the external effects of investment in material or immaterial capital, the training of human capital, infrastructure measures and research and development incentives. Despite their highly abstract nature, the new approaches to growth theory bring to light some of the important aspects which can be responsible for high growth rates.
A number of the considerations in the model deal with one of the driving forces of economic growth: investments (see f.e. Romer 1986) . Investment increases enterprises' production capacities and creates income by the generation of capital goods. Each individual investment decision does not only concern the investing enterprise, but also has consequences for competitors. These external effects become very clear in research and development. If, for example, an enterprise successfully injects extensive resources into developing a new product, in other words forms a new marketable product, the know-how of the enterprise in question is increased. In normal circumstances it will not be possible to keep all new findings secret from other suppliers. The final opportunity for the competitors to learn from this product and draw conclusions for their own development is the moment the product comes on the market. They can to a certain extent participate as free riders in the benefits of the innovative enterprise. An example of how relevant these considerations are is the often-cited imitation and improvement strategy of Japanese enterprises. The same is true for the individual decision to increase the human capital. Better training raises personal opportunities for employment with better remuneration and at the same time the whole team can profit from this investment. If these social, external effects are diagnosed, there is room for State action. The individual investor will not take account of these external aspects in coming to a decision, which will lead to a sub-optimal national economic investment level. Appropriate State incentives could improve this situation.
In the context of the new growth theory, the rôle of the education system for the development potential of national economies also comes under scrutiny. The efficiency of educational measures as one of the decisive elements in determining the growth rate in consumption is demonstrated in a central model by Robert E. Lucas jr. (1988) , who currently holds the Nobel prize for economic science. Improved workforce training therefore offers the opportunity to achieve more growth. It's exactly in this field that many national economies leave much to be desired. One only has to recall the poor public education system in the US or the overcrowded lecture halls in German universities.
Interesting findings are delivered by another branch of the new growth theory, which in the tradition of Joseph A. Schumpeter's thoughts on innovative entrepreneurs, centres upon the consequences of investment in research and development.
5 When innovative enterprises introduce a new product onto the market, they can enjoy a monopoly, at least temporarily, as potential competitors have not yet reached their level of knowledge. The research resulting from the enterprises' extra profits brings an increase in opportunities for the consumer, whereby they can reap a greater benefit. At the same time, however, every new or improved product erodes the profit margins of existing suppliers. The creative effects of research and development, owing to a more extensive and enhanced supply of goods, contrast with the destructive effects on the competitors' profit margins. In addition to these consequences the new growth theory models in question emphasise a further characteristic of successful investment in research and development. The know-how of tomorrow's researchers is being increased by the work of the current research generation, in other words we have intertemporal external effects, although enterprises are not going to take these into account when deciding on their research expenditure. State intervention might possibly increase efficiency in this respect, if all the results of the enterprises' actions are made clear to them.
Despite the justification for industrial policy measures that can be concluded from the findings of the new research theory, it must be borne in mind that we are dealing with highly-abstract models. empirical scrutiny is still in its early stages. 6 Only tendential statements are therefore to be gained on the effects of State intervention -quantifiable politico-economic recommendations cannot be deduced. They point nonetheless to important areas of successful industrial policy: promoting research and development investments, reinforcing willingness to show innovation, establishing effective patent regulations, supporting training and retraining, establishing an adequate infrastructure (including telecommunications facilities). The big advantage of the new growth theory is in particular the emphasis placed upon market incompleteness on the basis of which only State intervention can influence the long-term growth path of a national economy. The new approaches, however, do not lead to exclusive dependence on the State in the event of higher growth rates being achieved. It is more the case that market processes continue to play a predominant rôle.
Alongside this newer economic-theoretical reasoning in favour of an active rôle for the State, other research, such as the work of Michael Porter gives an indication of the validity of the industrial policy procedures outlined above. In the framework of an international study, Porter examined whether generally-accepted success factors can be identified as responsible for the international competitiveness of enterprises or branches of industry. The study showed that above all a capacity for innovation and development is one of the most important features for a successful national economy. The creation of new knowledge, and its use, contribute decisively to enterprises' success and therefore the success of an economy on the world market. Besides the relevance of production factors, the market conditions and trade structures in a country, Porter also underlines the considerable significance of competition for a national economy's development opportunities. It is not the prevention of competition in a country, but rather its creation which provides for flexible, adaptable enterprises. Long-lasting monopolies or oligopolies which are under no threat from potential competitors tend to neglect the search for new products and markets. The dynamic element of competition is a precondition which cannot be neglected when it comes to the international success of national industries. To demonstrate this, Porter refers to the situation on the Japanese markets, where the marketing of product ideas faces very intense competition, resulting in the state having to assume responsibility for assuring adequate competition. Decisions and measures taken by the State have to put companies under constant pressure of competition. This involves consequent competition controls and low levels of protection for national enterprises from international competitors. The success of any protection measures will be destined to be short-lived. If they do not lead to competitive enterprises they will not be able to withstand international pressure when protection measures are withdrawn.
Further support for the new industrial policy can also be found in the thoughts of Robert Reich (1991) . Owing to enterprises' increasing international flexibility, ties to a single location are increasingly losing significance. The harmony between business success and international success is dissolving. According to Reich, the contribution that the population, in other words the workforce potential, of a country can make is an increasingly important aspect. An enterprise's nationality will no longer be decisive. What is relevant is where investment can take place, which makes high levels of employment, and high incomes for the employees possible. In other words, the production factor of human capital will constantly gain significance. The industrial policy of a country or organisation such as the EU, must make it attractive for investment through the establishment of a qualified 6 This is also a reason for the partial reluctance of advocates of the new growth theory to derive new industrial policy recommendations.
workforce potential, capable of innovation, and through provision of adequate infrastructure. National economies like those of the US, Japan and Europe (in this case particularly Germany) cannot compete in the long-term with low-wage economies which have comparative cost advantages in routine production activity. According to Reich, the aim should be setting requirements for increasing the qualifications of the workforce. Naturally, there will not only be high-tech jobs in all countries, but above all the service industries will provide jobs in the so-called customerorientated services.
The approach to the new growth theories, briefly outlined so far, and the works of Porter and Reich, set out an industrial policy procedure as suggested and partly-implemented by the EU Commission. The planned objectives and measures centre upon factors which had also been identified as promoting growth in the theoretical models.
However, the ultimate success of a new industrial policy will also depend very much on the willingness of all the participants.
Conclusions
In the course of recession in the most important industrial countries in the late 1980s (the US, the United Kingdom, France) and early 1990s (Japan, Germany) and rising unemployment in the EU, interest in the possibilities of a more efficient industrial policy rose in the countries and regions affected. This tendency was reinforced by the continuing rapid growth at the same time in eastern and south-east Asian national economies, whose growing share of world trade was interpreted as shrinking competitive strength among the industrialised countries. 7 Higher national debts and State expenditure are considered by several OECD countries as critical when it comes to future development, given that they counteract market efficiency. This consequently inhibits a stronger use of resources for industrial policy purposes, given that the state expenditure of a more slender state dictates squeezing resources in this area too.
A long list of resources allocated by the state, which should have gone towards improving structure and securing international competitiveness were subsequently proven to be a costly bad investment (for example, promotion of fast-breeder reactors). On the other hand the active rôle of the State, especially in Japan and the newly-industrialised eastern and south-east Asian countries is seen as an indication of the possible success of industrial policy. Despite this acknowledgement, it so far seems extremely difficult, however, to achieve a social consensus as regards defining areas of industrial policy action which promise success. A fundamental cause is the inadequate forecasting of economic development which stands in the way of long-term industrial policy planning. Only too often the situations or developments on the markets are misjudged, resulting in unsuitable promotion strategies. This is not merely a question of judging objective market development, for example the increasing significance of micro-electronics or information technology, but rather there is a lack of 7
The loss of Germany's share in world trade does not necessarily signal competitive weakness, if these countries manage to achieve a higher economic growth because of the population's per capita income continuing to lag significantly behind. As long as Germany attains a significant rise in exports, accompanied by an extensive balance of trade surplus in its foreign business these development trends are no cause for concern.
appropriate means for identifying suitable partners in the spirit of Schumpeter's entrepreneurial personalities, which can successfully bring into play the means at disposal for developing and marketing new products. Since State support measures are not controlled or guaranteed by the market, resources are directed to possible objectively-correct areas, yet are absent enterprises that successfully hold their ground in the market. In this way the German and French governments invested considerable sums in electronic research, but the national champions, Siemens and Bull, were not in a position to employ these resources successfully in the market. Industrial policy, however, still has to rely on capable partners on the enterprise side, in as much as it only covers financial support for enterprises or whole industrial sectors. Where appropriate partners are missing, such a policy will be unsuccessful. Frequently State support is at least considered to assist in the creation of human capital, as even unsuccessful projects have produced well-qualified personnel. The success of industrial policy therefore does not lie in the outcome of the project, but in the spillover effects, enhancing the qualifications of the participants in the project.
There has tended to be a relative loss of momentum in international discussions on industrial policy which is confronted with competition policy activities and forced liberalisation of world trade through the founding of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the extension of regional trading blocks, in particular the EU (with the accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria as well as the potential accession of Central and Eastern European states), NAFTA, possibly to encompass the whole of America as a free trade zone by 2005, APEC as a free trade zone by 2010. Should the intended efforts to accelerate liberalisation win through, it is inevitable that the previous scope for industrial policy will shrink. One example of this is the obligation for WTO member states to dismantle tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, including a series of State subsidies for certain branches of industry. Although it remains to be seen how successfully conflicts between single States or groups of countries will be solved when it is put to the test. This situation should, however, increasingly be used in the debate on industrial policy in Germany, so that necessary adaptations can be made to the industrial policy practices to date and a clear concept can be developed for an industrial policy which takes into account the demands of European countries and especially Germany as a location of industry under the new outline conditions. Furthermore, it is necessary to develop sanction mechanisms which should be employed in case of a failure to comply with the competitive policy guidelines.
The preferred option is therefore a competition-orientated industrial policy which is suited to the changed world economic outline conditions, in an effort to emulate the concepts of the East Asian countries which have proven successful in the past. The successes achieved in these countries are not, however, compatible with the economic order of free international competition being sought. Any attempt to copy them now in Germany or any other Western industrial countries, could only jeopardise the success of efforts being made to liberalise world trade and dismantle unfair practices. An industrial policy for Germany in the mid-1990s has therefore to be a policy which is consistent with the world economic outline conditions for free international competition and which takes account of the population's requirements for safeguarding their employment opportunities in the German location.
The EU Commission's objectives and measures must be judged against these considerations. Any industrial policy actions should not damage competition between European enterprises and international competition. The Commission's explicit requirement for a competition-orientated environment must be implemented. Only then will it be possible to develop internationallycompetitive industries. A new competition-orientated industrial policy must be long-term and create outline conditions for competitive enterprises, through the -promotion of research and development investment, the spread of technical innovations, training and retraining, and the establishment of necessary infrastructures. Here, and in the support of special key industries, as well as in State decisions as regards demand, adequate competition among enterprises should be provided for. For example, in the research phase, cooperation and exchange of information must be possible, and the subsequent marketing of new products has to be subject to market decisions. In the context of such industrial policy a major rôle is played by merger and competition controls, and above all questions as to the relevant market must constantly be raised. The EU Commission has to be measured against its own requirements.
At national level too, a competition-orientated industrial policy would be an adequate answer for the German economy to meet its full growth potential. Accelerated economic growth in Germany, i.e. long-term growth in GDP of a minimum of 3% per year, congruent with stronger growth in the world economy, could make a significant contribution towards job creation and a meaningful if certainly not sufficient contribution to reducing high unemployment. On the other hand, industrial policy which can be regarded as merely a redistribution of an existing international employment potential increases the danger of reducing the world economy's growth potential. Such industrial policy would therefore not be a game of no totals but a game in which all participants would lose owing to non-cooperative antagonistic strategies.
A long-term competition-orientated industrial policy will only slowly show its effects on employment. Short-term sectoral adjustment processes will be necessary, leading to the release of workforces. In doing this, social cushioning must be guaranteed, which should not result in prevention of structural changes, but in the creation of new qualifications among the workforces and new employment opportunities. In the short to mid-term an industrial policy geared to increasing the growth potential of the German economy will not be sufficient to achieve a quick reduction in unemployment. A mixed strategy with two distinct components is required. There must be clarification of whether growth in Germany should be more strongly production-orientated as in the past or, looking to the future, more employment-orientated. The question also has to be asked as to allocation of available work volumes at any given time.
As the most recent experience of the US upturn has shown, the result was not the much-feared jobless growth. The US's continuing leading position as regards productivity, regardless of whether her economic growth should be more production or employment-orientated leaves her much more scope for decision, which she can use to achieve more employment growth. This option could not be chosen in Germany or other EU countries because they lagged behind considerably when it came to productivity. Given that this gap has been extensively closed in the recent past, a higher priority could be placed on reducing mass unemployment in Germany and the EU. This is particularly possible with branches of the economy that are not directly confronted by international competition, because they produce goods and services that are not tradable internationally. The increase in the absorbing capacity when it comes to the creation of additional jobs would enhance the overall effects of economic growth for job creation. Naturally, it remains to be seen to what extent such an option for choice exists and what consequences sectorally backward productivity growth will have for the incomes of the employees affected. This problem is demonstrated by the sharp increase in the number of low-paid jobs in the US.
The second component, which has to be considered in overcoming mass unemployment, is the allocation of available work volumes. Different forms of short-working have to be developed for employees, but this should not endanger the quality of the German location. Shortening weekly working hours is only one element of an employment policy strategy which should be more tuned to the need to create more flexible and highly-qualified human capital in Germany. Safeguarding jobs therefore also requires a stronger link between regulations on working hours and securing employee qualifications. With the creation of additional jobs via regulations on working hours, the existing employees would have to tolerate a loss of income, which would find compensation in the higher job security resulting from better qualifications. It would be more likely that employees would accept acts of solidarity to redistribute work volumes among employees and unemployed, if they are faced not only by costs but returns from changed regulations on working hours, even if these do not lead directly to current consumption.
Such a reallocation of work volumes closes the circle of the requirements and objectives of a new industrial policy discussed above and also expressed by the EU Commission. The creation of new jobs through the implementation of new models of working hours will be supplemented with a more highly qualified workforce seen as necessary also from the point of view of industrial policy. However, such a measure requires a consensus between the participants involved, as well as a move to long-term industrial policy concepts. Whether the various strategies for increasing competitiveness and the reduction of mass unemployment can be realised depends to a large extent on whether the representatives are ready for dialogue and can be depended upon to push through and uphold the decisions taken.
